



August 6, 2024

Brad Raffensperger
Secretary of State
Georgia Department of State
214 State Capitol
Atlanta, GA 30334

Georgia State Election Board
Chairman John Fervier and Members of the State Election Board
2 MLK Jr. Drive
Suite 802 Floyd West Tower
Atlanta, GA 30334

Via electronic mail only

RE: Notice Pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (52 U.S.C. §20510(b)(2))

Dear Secretary Raffensperger, Georgia State Election Board, Chairman Fervier and Members of the Board,

We are writing on behalf of the Georgia State Conference of the NAACP (“Georgia NAACP”) and Georgia Coalition for the People’s Agenda, Inc. (GCPA), their respective members, and other persons and organizations similarly situated, to give notice to you that the “GA Voter Registration Cancellation Portal” (“Portal”) launched by Georgia Secretary of State, Brad Raffensperger, on July 29, 2024 (See, <https://cancelmyregistration.sos.ga.gov/s/>), including the electronic form provided through the Portal to cancel a voter’s registration, violates the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the “NVRA”) as set forth more fully below.

Because the Portal and electronic form violate the NVRA, we are demanding on behalf of the GA NAACP and GCPA that you immediately cease operation and use of the Portal and online electronic form; cease and desist from any and all actions to remove any registered voters from Georgia’s voter registration rolls as a result of the submission of a voter registration cancellation form through the Portal; and to secure any and all data submitted to or from the Portal to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the system to cancel any voters’ registration.

The GA NAACP and GCPA also demand your compliance with the requests for records contained herein pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) and the Georgia Open Records Act (O.C.G.A. § 80-18-70, *et. seq.*).

If you fail or refuse to take all appropriate remedial action, including, but not limited to, refusing



to cease operation of the Portal, failing to take action to secure all data received and transmitted by the Portal, restoring all Georgia voters who have had their voter registrations cancelled as a result of the Portal, and failing to provide substantive responses to the requests for records contained herein within the next twenty (20) days, the Georgia NAACP and GCPA, their respective members, and other persons and organizations similarly situated, reserve all of their rights to take any and all appropriate action in response.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2024, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger announced the launch of the voter registration cancellation Portal in a press release posted on the Secretary of State's official website entitled, "Raffensperger Simplifies Cancelling Voter Registrations and Increasing Voter Roll Accuracy ("Press Release").¹

The Press Release states, in pertinent part, that:

Voters who wish to cancel their registration will simply access the site, enter their secret personal identifying information (such as Drivers License/State ID # or Full/Partial SSN), and indicate that they wish to be removed from the list of registered voters. County voter registration officials will receive a notification through GARViS and remove the voter from the rolls.

See Exhibit 1, at 1.

Secretary Raffensperger promoted the site in the Press Release as another tool for voter list maintenance, stating:

"We do voter list maintenance in Georgia every day," said Raffensperger. "This is one more method that's convenient for voters and efficient for election officials."

Id. at 2.

The Press Release further states that this technology will "lead to fewer clerical errors and peace of mind for any user, knowing that their Georgia voter registration is securely cancelled when they move to another state, or when a loved ones passes away" and that it would "also help keep

¹ The press release is available on the Georgia Secretary of State's website at this link: <https://sos.ga.gov/news/raffensperger-simplifies-cancelling-voter-registrations-and-increasing-voter-roll-accuracy>. A PDF copy of the press release is attached and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 1.



Georgia's voter registration database up-to-date without having to rely on postcards being sent and returned by an increasingly inefficient postal system," alluding to the process mandated in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (52 U.S.C. § 20507 (c) and (d)) concerning a state's removal of voters from the registration rolls who are registered to vote in federal elections. *Id.* at 1-2.

The Press Release also states that Secretary of State Raffensperger would be "providing the secure link to closing attorneys and realtors in Georgia so that cancelling an out-of-date voter registration will be a part of the moving process." *Id.* at 2. The Press Release does not explain how these third parties would be able to access the secure site or how closing attorneys and realtors would make voter registration cancellation part of the moving process, particularly since not every move disqualifies a voter from continuing to vote if their permanent residence is still in the same jurisdiction of the Georgia registrar or even if they move out of state within thirty days of a presidential election and retain the right to vote for the presidential ticket one last time in Georgia where they were residing and registered to vote prior to the move.

In order to access the Portal, the user submits information commonly available to persons other than the voter on the site's landing page, <https://cancelmyregistration.sos.ga.gov/s/>, which includes the first initial and last name of the voter, the voter's date of birth, and the voter's county of registration. Thus, it provides no guarantee that only a registered Georgia voter seeking to cancel their own registration or a family member of a deceased relative are able to access the site.

After entering this basic information on the landing page, the user is directed to select one of three reasons for cancellation of a voter registration: 1) moved out of state; 2) voter no longer wishes to be registered in the State of Georgia; or 3) voter is deceased.

Except in the case of a user seeking to cancel the registration of a deceased family member, which does require the user to identify themselves as the user, the electronic cancellation form on the Portal does not require the user to affirmatively state that the user is, in fact, the voter seeking cancellation of their own Georgia voter registration.

For example, if the user selects "voter has moved out of state" as the reason for cancellation, the form only requests the user to click a box requesting the "new state of residence" of the voter. A drop-down list of states becomes available on the form and the user selects a state from the drop-down list.

The form on the Portal also does not require the user to provide their new address in another state. Instead, the form is prepopulated with the voter's name and residential address of their Georgia voter registration based upon the preliminary information provided by the user on the landing page, i.e., first initial, last name, date of birth and county of a voter and the voter registration data



on file in GARViS for that individual. Thus, a county registrar receiving the cancellation request on the GARViS dashboard would not have a voter's new address outside of Georgia to send a voter who moved out of state a written cancellation notice.

The electronic form on the Portal then asks the user to enter a Georgia driver's license number or state ID card number in a box on the form. Once the user submits that information, a popup box appears on the screen which warns of the existence of criminal penalties for the submission of false information to a registrar of voters, along with two check boxes which the user is required to check which state: 1) The information I have provided is true and accurate; and 2) I assent by the submission of this Online Voter Registration Cancellation Request to the use of my signature from my Driver's License or Identification Card.

While the user must check the aforementioned boxes, the form does not require the user to specifically affirm that they are, in fact, the voter seeking cancellation in the case of a move out of state or the more general cancellation request, nor has the user personally "provided" some of the information which has been automatically populated into fields on the form. Including the full name and address of the voter on file in GARViS.

Prior to completion of the form requesting cancellation, the user receives no warning that a move out of state may not render the voter ineligible to continue to vote in Georgia, including by absentee ballot, such as when a voter moves to another state after the close of registration where the voter remains eligible to vote in Georgia; where a voter has moved out of state temporarily while attending school with a present intent to return to Georgia; or in the case of other temporary moves where the voter does not intend to change their permanent residence to a location outside of the jurisdiction of their county registrar.

Although the Press Release refers to the requirement that the user input a voter's Georgia driver's license or ID number on the form as "secret" data, Exhibit 1, at 1, third parties often have access to this precise information about a registered voter, including, but not limited to, employers, banks, mortgage and other loan providers and servicers, credit reporting agencies, retail outlets, motor vehicle sales and rental agencies, medical providers, family members and friends, caretakers, hackers who have stolen personal identification, and others who routinely request and retain these data from Georgia voters and others in the normal course of business.

Due to security failures by the office of the Secretary of State, including in connection with the launch of the Portal itself in which Secretary Raffensperger's office confirmed voters' "secret" data were exposed to persons accessing the Portal, as well as additional security lapses identified by media outlets in the days after the Portal's initial launch;² along with prior security breaches

² See, e.g., Brendan Keefe, *Security flaw allowed anyone to request cancellation of Georgia voter*



by the Secretary of State's office and others, including by Coffee County election officials, unauthorized persons may have accessed the full or last four digits of voters' Social Security numbers, driver's license or state ID numbers and these data are not "secret" as Secretary Raffensperger has claimed.

While the Georgia Secretary of State's office has claimed that the data breach in which voters' "secret" identification data were displayed on the Portal's online application form was corrected within an hour of the Portal's launch, it appears that the site remained vulnerable to security breaches through at least July 31, 2024. For example, *The Current* newspaper reported an additional problem to the Secretary of State's office after they observed another security flaw on the site. In responding to the second security flaw identified by *The Current*, the Secretary of State's office acknowledged it was aware of the flaw identified by *The Current* and had planned to correct it, but somehow the fix was not implemented before it was reported by *The Current*.

The site's already known data and security breaches are compounded by the fact that there have been several data breaches in which sensitive personally identifying information of Georgia voters has been compromised in recent years. In 2015, for example, personally identifying information ("PII") of more than six million Georgia voters was inadvertently provided by the Georgia Secretary of State's office to twelve recipients who routinely ordered updates to Georgia voter registration lists. The recipients included partisan organizations, press outlets and others not authorized to receive PII of these voters.³

registrations, Atlanta News First, 8/5/24, available here: <https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2024/08/05/security-flaw-allowed-anyone-request-cancellation-georgia-voter-registrations/>; Doug Bock Clark, "A Terrible Vulnerability": Cybersecurity Researcher Discovers Yet Another Flaw in Georgia's Voter Cancellation Portal, ProPublica, 8/5/24, available at: <https://www.propublica.org/article/cybersecurity-expert-finds-another-flaw-in-georgia-voter-portal>; Doug Bock Clark, *Marjorie Taylor Greene's and Brad Raffensperger's Voter Registrations Targeted in Georgia's New Online Portal*; ProPublica, 8/3/24, available at: <https://www.propublica.org/article/georgia-voter-registration-cancellation-portal-mtg-raffensperger>; Mark Neisse, *Georgia voter cancellation site prompts concerns of abuse after leak*, AJC, 8/3/24; Maggie Lee, *Georgia voter cancellation portal requires second round of security fixes*, *The Current*, 7/31/24, available at: <https://thecurrentga.org/2024/07/31/georgia-voter-cancellation-portal-requires-second-round-of-security-fixes/>; Jeff Amy and Charlotte Kramon, *Georgia website that lets people cancel voter registrations briefly displayed personal data*; Associated Press, 7/30/24, available at: <https://apnews.com/article/georgia-cancel-voter-registration-personal-information-5bf7d7d474e0e077c7fd50141ff487e8>.

³ See, e.g., Kristina Torres, *Data breach in Georgia could affect 6 million voters*, AJC, 11/18/2015;



Subsequent voter data breaches, including, but not limited to, a successful effort by partisan agents to access Coffee County voting equipment and data in the aftermath of the 2020 general election make it foreseeable that the PII of Georgia's registered voters necessary to access the Portal to request the cancellation of voter registrations may still be available to bad actors who could use these data to cancel the voter registrations of Georgia's voters by using the Portal and online form.⁴ As a result, the Portal is vulnerable to misuse by unauthorized persons who could potentially use the exact data required to complete the Portal's electronic voter cancellation form to cancel a duly registered voter's registration for nefarious reasons.

Despite all of this, remarkably, the Portal and its online voter registration cancellation form do not require the applicant to sign the electronic form. This is not required even though a paper voter registration cancellation form offered by the Georgia Secretary of State on his website does mandate that the form be signed by an applicant seeking to cancel their own voter registration or the voter registration of a deceased family member. See, <https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/Voter%20Registration%20Cancellation%20Form.pdf>. Thus, the Portal and online cancellation form do not prevent persons other than the voter from completing the online form. As a result, the form poses a high risk for fraud by bad actors or others who could access and submit the form to cancel a voter's registration without their permission or knowledge.

Additionally, without any warning about the effect and timing of the cancellation of the voter's registration discussed on the Portal, including on the Portal's registration electronic cancellation form, a registered Georgia voter may not understand that they may remain eligible to vote in Georgia if they only temporarily move to another state for school, work or for other reasons with the present intention of maintaining Georgia as their permanent domicile; and, if they are serving in the United States military or are overseas voters, living abroad, they may continue to be

Max Blau, *Behind the #PeachBreach: How the Secretary of State's office compromised the personal data of Georgia's voters*, Atlanta Magazine, 12/15/2015; Curt Devine and Drew Griffen, *6 million Georgia voters' records exposed: 'Could have easily been compromised,'* CNN, 8/14/2018, available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/georgia-brian-kemp-voter-data/index.html>;

⁴ Emma Brown and Jon Swaine, *What happened with voting machines in Coffee County, Ga.?*, Washington Post, 11/28/22, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/28/coffee-county-election-voting-machines/>; Elle Reeve and Samantha Guff, *'Crooked Coffee': The alleged election office breach in the Trump indictment was part of a years-long pattern, some locals say*, CNN, 9/2/2023, available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/02/politics/georgia-coffee-county-breach-voters/index.html>; Randy Travis, *He boasted about breaching election computers, forever linking Fulton and Coffee County*, Fox5 Atlanta, 8/23/2023, available at: <https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/he-boasted-about-breaching-election-computers-forever-linking-fulton-and-coffee-county>.



registered to vote in Georgia pursuant to UOCAVA.

While Georgia's 159 county registrars are tasked with the responsibility for removing registered voters from the voter registration rolls in response to the submission of the electronic form from the Portal, it is unclear how county registrars would know, or even suspect, that the online submission has been made by an unauthorized person, particularly in the absence of the applicant's wet signature on the form.

It also appears from the Press Release that the Secretary has provided information about accessing the Portal and electronic form to real estate and closing agents to facilitate the removal of voters from the registration rolls when they move. However, the Secretary of State has failed to disclose what safeguards have been or are being employed to ensure that the voter's personally identifying information in the possession of these third parties is not used by such individuals (or others having access to the voter's personally identifying information) to cancel an eligible voter's registration.

The Portal and electronic form also provide that a "family" member of a deceased voter may use the Portal and online form to request the cancellation of a deceased family member's voter registration. However, the Portal and electronic form do not require the "family" member to provide any proof of their familial relationship with the deceased voter; any legal authority bestowed up the family member by a will, trust document, or court order, to administer the affairs of the deceased individual; or even any proof that the voter is, in fact, deceased, other than to inquire whether there is an obituary. In fact, Georgia law already provides for the routine disclosure of official data to Georgia's County registrars so that they may take action to challenge and remove voters who are deceased based upon official data sources evidencing the death of the voter. See, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-231(d) and (e). Although the O.C.G.A. § 21-2-231 (e.1) permits registrars to consider information supplied by family members about a deceased family member in determining whether to cancel the registration of a deceased voter, it does not mandate cancellation based solely about information supplied by a family member.

Since the Portal and online form were launched on July 29, 2024, the Georgia Secretary of State has confirmed to the press that the Portal has been misused, including by persons attempting to cancel the voter registration of the Secretary of State and Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Green.⁵ Thus, it is not speculative that bad actors will attempt to misuse the site to remove registered voters from the registration rolls in the future.

⁵ Doug Bock Clark, *Marjorie Taylor Greene's and Brad Raffensperger's Voter Registrations Targeted in Georgia's New Online Portal*, ProPublica, 8/3/24, available at: <https://www.propublica.org/article/georgia-voter-registration-cancellation-portal-mtg-raffensperger>.



As discussed more fully below, the Portal and its online electronic form violate the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (52 U.S.C. § 20507) and the Secretary of State must immediately cease and desist in continuing to operate the Portal and electronic form in violation of the NVRA.

II. GEORGIA'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993 (52 U.S.C. § 20507)

A. The Portal violates Section (d) of the NVRA

As the Secretary of State for the State of Georgia, Brad Raffensperger is Georgia's Chief Elections Officer. O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-50, 21-2-50.2. He is thus responsible for ensuring Georgia's compliance with the NVRA. See, 52 U.S.C. § 20509.

Section 8(d) of the NVRA specifies that a registered Georgia voter can only be removed from the state's voter registration rolls for a purported change of address when the registered voter:

(A) confirms in writing that the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in which the registrant is registered; or (B)(i) has failed to respond to a notice described in paragraph (2); and (ii) has not voted or appeared to vote (and, if necessary, correct the registrar's record of the registrant's address) in an election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice.

52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(emphasis added). Any removal of a voter for a purported change of address that does not comply with Section 8 violates Section (d) of the NVRA.

In this case, a cancellation request through the Portal contains no verification that the form is actually submitted by the registered voter rather than by a third party with access to the voter's Georgia driver's license or state ID number or last four digits of the voter's Social Security number. Unlike the mail-in cancellation form, there is no signature requirement verifying that the person completing the form is actually the voter requesting the cancellation of their own registration. Thus, it cannot constitute "confirmation" in writing by the voter that they have changed their place of residence to a location outside of their registrar's jurisdiction as required by 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d).

Indeed, because of the absence of any subscribed oath or mandate of a wet signature on the form by the applicant, and given the likelihood that persons other than the registered voter have access to their Georgia driver's license or state ID number or the last four digits of their social security number to complete the form on the Portal, it is unclear how county registrars would even know or have any reason to believe that the Portal's online form was actually submitted by the



registrant in order to constitute the mandated “confirmation in writing” to comply with Section (d) of the NVRA.

Thus, the GA NAACP and GCPA demand that the Secretary immediately cease operation of the Portal and its online electronic voter registration cancellation form because they likely violate Section (d) of the NVRA.

B. The Portal and its online form are likely to violate the uniformity provision of Section 8 of the NVRA

Section 8 of the NVRA mandates that “any State program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office ... shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(1).

According to the Secretary of State’s Press Release, (Exhibit 1) county voter registration officials will receive a notification through GARVIS and remove the voter from the rolls. There is no indication about whether or how county election officials would know or have reason to know that an unauthorized third party submitted a voter registration cancellation form via the Portal or, even if they did become aware, that all 159 Georgia county election officials would administer their response to unauthorized or potentially fraudulent submissions of voter registration cancellation forms via the portal in a uniform or nondiscriminatory manner.

Additionally, while it appears that county election officials may send a notice to a cancelled voter via a mailed postcard Georgia law does not expressly provide for the reinstatement of a voter’s registration in instances such as one where an unauthorized person accesses an online Portal and submits the Portal’s cancellation form online.

This is particularly concerning given the closeness of the upcoming November 5, 2024 general election and because unanswered questions remain about the potential disqualification of voters’ absentee ballots for that election based upon fraudulent submissions of online cancellation forms through the Portal; whether and how a voter would be able to cure provisional ballots they are required to cast if they discover that their voter registration was cancelled as a result of an unauthorized person submitting a cancellation form via the Portal after the close of voter registration for the November 5, 2024 general election and runoffs; or what the voter would need to prove in order to have their voter registration restored after the close of registration for the November 5, 2024 election or in future elections with federal candidates on the ballot.

Thus, there is a significant risk that Georgia’s 159 county election officials will be unable to administer the voter registration cancellation forms submitted via the Portal in a uniform and



nondiscriminatory manner when by design the system provides no evidence on its face to election officials that the electronic form was submitted by the voter (except in the case of family members submitted forms on behalf of their deceased relatives), nor any way for the county election officials to be able to detect whether the form was submitted by someone other than the registered voters. As a result, the Portal and its online electronic form likely violate the uniformity provision of 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(1).

**III. REQUESTS FOR RECORDS PURSUANT TO 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) AND THE
GEORGIA OPEN RECORDS ACT (O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70, et. seq.)
by the GEORGIA NAACP AND GCPA**

Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) and the Georgia Open Records Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70, et. seq.) the Georgia NAACP and GCPA demand that you and your agents produce the following records to the undersigned within the next 20 days:

1. All records evidencing any and all communications with Georgia's county election officials concerning the voter registration Portal and electronic form, including, but not limited to, the following categories of communications:

a. All information conveyed to Georgia's County election officials about the Portal and online electronic cancellation form prior to the launch of the Portal on July 29, 2024.

b. All written, online and/or recorded instructions, guidance, training, best practices, Official Election Bulletins and any other materials or information provided or made available to County election officials about their implementation and use of the voter registration cancellation Portal and its electronic form, including, but not limited to instructions, training or guidance for determining whether the Portal and/or its electronic the voter registration cancellation form was used, or attempted to be used, by the registered voter or by someone other than the registered voter to request the cancellation of a voter's registration and/or how to detect that an electronic voter registration cancellation form was submitted by someone other than the registered voter requesting the cancellation.

c. All communications made to and/or from Georgia election officials on internal messaging systems about the Portal and/or its electronic online form, including, but not limited to, communications posted to the internal online message forum known as, "the Buzz."

2. All communications with third parties, including by County election officials, voters, members of the press, political parties, elected officials or other individuals, about the security or lack thereof of the Portal or its electronic online form before and after its launch on July 29, 2024.



3. All records evidencing the number of submissions made through the Portal since it was launched on July 29, 2024.

4. All records evidencing the total number of IP addresses and MAC addresses used to make submissions through the Portal since its launch on July 29, 2024.

5. All records evidencing whether any IP address or any MAC address made more than two submissions through the Portal since its launch on July 29, 2024.

6. All records evidencing any other data that may indicate more than two submissions through the Portal from the same submitter or source since its launch on July 29, 2024.

7. All records evidencing the number of voter registration cancellation forms submitted through the Portal since July 29, 2024.

8. All records evidencing the number of voter registrations cancelled as a result of the use of the Portal and/or submission of an online electronic voter registration cancellation form through the Portal since the launch of the Portal on July 29, 2024.

9. All records evidencing the misuse or attempted misuse of the Portal and/or its electronic cancellation form since the launch of the Portal on

10. All records evidencing the Secretary of State's office was aware of known flaws and/or security risks of the Portal and/or its electronic voter registration cancellation form which have not been entirely corrected as of the date of your response to this records request.

11. All records evidencing communications with closing attorneys and realtors concerning the Portal and its online electronic cancellation form, including but not limited to, all communications concerning secure access given to such persons by the Secretary of State's office to the voter registration cancellation Portal and/or its electronic voter registration cancellation form as stated in the Secretary's Press Release or otherwise.

12. All records evidencing the use of the Portal and/or its electronic voter registration cancellation form by any closing attorneys, realtors and/or their agents, employees or others as a result of providing secure access to the Portal as described in the Secretary of State's Press Release.

13. All records evidencing any secure access to the Portal and/or its online voter registration form provided to other persons in the private sector in addition to closing attorneys and realtors before or after the launch of the Portal and its electronic cancellation form on July 29, 2024.

14. All records identifying any and all vendors or third parties who created installed, tested or sold the technology for the voter registration cancellation Portal, including, but not limited to, all



contracts, MOU's, agreements, bids or other proposals, and all communications with such individuals, including after you were on notice of security breaches, flaws or other deficiencies with the Portal.

Please send all records in response to these requests to the undersigned.

CONCLUSION


As you know, in less than 120 days, the next election for federal offices will be conducted on November 5, 2024. If the violations identified above are not corrected within the next 20 days, i.e., by August 26, 2024, the Georgia NAACP and GCPA reserve all of their rights to take any and all appropriate action to remedy these violations.

Please be advised that we are prepared to meet with you and other officials at your earliest convenience to discuss these violations and to assist in your development of a comprehensive plan that addresses the problems identified in this letter.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ezra Rosenberg

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Georgia
Secretary of State
Brad Raffensperger



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July 29th, 2024

Atlanta - Today Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger announced a web portal to allow voters to cancel their voter registration online. While leveraging the same technical process and security protocols as Georgia's wildly popular and secure OnLine Voter Registration tool,

[OLVR](#)

,
[this new secure site](#)

, allows voters who are moving or opting out of voter registration to notify their county registrar that they want their registration cancelled.

"This is a convenient tool for any voter who wants to secure their voter registration by cancelling their old one when they move out of state," said Raffensperger. "It will also help keep Georgia's voter registration database up-to-date without having to rely on postcards being sent and returned by an increasingly inefficient postal system."

Voters who wish to cancel their registration will simply access the site, enter their secret personal identifying information (such as Drivers License/State ID # or Full/Partial SSN), and indicate that they wish to be removed from the list of registered voters. County voter registration officials will receive a notification through GARViS and remove the voter from the rolls.

This innovative adoption of state-of-the-art technology will lead to fewer clerical errors and peace of mind for any user, knowing that their Georgia voter registration is securely cancelled when they move to another state, or when a loved ones passes away.

Secretary Raffensperger added that he would be providing the secure link to closing attorneys and realtors in Georgia so that cancelling an out-of-date voter registration will be a part of the moving process.

“We do voter list maintenance in Georgia every day,” said Raffensperger. “This is one more method that’s convenient for voters and efficient for election officials.”

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Georgia is recognized as a national leader in elections. It was the first state in the country to implement the trifecta of automatic voter registration, at least 17 days of early voting (which has been called the “gold standard”), and no-excuse absentee voting. Georgia continues to set records for voter turnout and election participation, seeing the largest increase in average turnout of any other state in the 2018 midterm election and record turnout in 2020, and 2022. 2022 achieved the largest single day of in-person early voting turnout in Georgia midterm history utilizing Georgia’s secure, paper ballot voting system. Most recently, Georgia ranked #1 for Election Integrity by the Heritage Foundation, a top ranking for Voter Accessibility by the Center for Election Innovation & Research and tied for number one in Election Administration by the Bipartisan Policy Center.