



Hate in Elections

How Racism and Bigotry Threaten Election Integrity in the United States



JAMES BYRD JR. CENTER TO STOP HATE
AT THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW



LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW

About the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

The Lawyers' Committee is a national civil rights and racial justice organization created at the request of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. President Kennedy sought to enlist the private bar's leadership and resources in combatting discrimination and the resulting inequalities in courtrooms across America. The Lawyers' Committee's mission is to secure equal justice for all through the rule of law, targeting in particular the inequities confronting African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities. The Lawyers' Committee's James Byrd Jr. Center to Stop Hate supports communities and individuals targeted for hate and challenges white supremacy by using creative legal advocacy, disrupting systems that enable hate, and educating the general public and policy makers. The Byrd Center to Stop Hate operates both a hotline and an online intake form, allowing individuals and communities targeted for hate to report hate crimes and hate incidents and seek support.

In addition, the Lawyers' Committee convenes the nationwide, nonpartisan Election Protection coalition. This coalition works year-round to ensure that all voters have an equal opportunity to vote and have that vote count. Made up of more than 200 local, state and national partners, Election Protection uses a wide range of tools to protect the right to vote, including a suite of voter protection hotlines: 866-OUR-VOTE (administered by the [Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law](#)), 888-VE-Y-VOTA (administered by the NALEO Educational Fund), 844-YALLA-US (Arabic/English) (administered by the [Arab American Institute](#)), and 888-API-VOTE (administered by [APIAVote](#) & [Asian Americans Advancing Justice-AAJC](#)). The Election Protection coalition also organizes field programs in target states which deploys poll monitors at polling places across the country.

Acknowledgments

Thank you to the many people who assisted with this report including Rebecca Amadi, Arusha Gordon, Justin Kwasa, Kieaira Lucas, Allison Nadler, Jennifer Nwachukwu, Nadia Owusu, Kevin Vo and David Brody. Thanks also to DLA Piper for helping finalize the report.



Introduction

As the 2020 general election approaches, reported hate crimes across our country continue, spreading terror and distrust, as white supremacists are emboldened by hate-filled rhetoric coming from public leaders. Recent FBI data on hate crimes shows an increase in hate violence, with African Americans the most frequent victims of hate crimes.¹

Elections are becoming increasingly marred by bias-motivated attempts to intimidate, confuse or otherwise deter voters from casting their ballot and candidates from making their voice heard. Many times, harassment and intimidation tactics target voters

A **hate crime** is generally defined as a crime against a person or property that is motivated by bias, prejudice, or hatred toward the personal, or perceived personal, characteristics of a victim, including race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.

A **hate incident** is based on the same behaviors and motivations as a hate crime, but does not rise to the level of a crime. For example, you may be a victim of hate speech, which, depending on the circumstances, may not constitute a crime (and may be protected under the First Amendment), but which may constitute a hate incident.²

and candidates based on categories and identities that receive special protections under federal and state law, such as race.

Hate crimes in the election context are unique compared to other crimes. Hate crimes are “messaging crimes”—meaning that the

When hate crimes or hate incidents occur during elections, they can send a message that it is dangerous to vote and deter members of historically marginalized groups from participating in the democratic process.

target of any one hate crime is not just the direct victim, but also anyone who shares the victim's targeted identity, whether that be race, gender, sexual orientation, or another protected category. Perpetrators of hate crimes and hate incidents attempt to send a message that anyone who shares that victim's identity is unwelcome. When hate crimes or hate incidents occur during elections, they can send a message that it is dangerous to vote and deter members of historically marginalized groups from participating in the democratic process. By discouraging communities of color and others from voting, perpetrators of hate incidents attempt to stifle the voices of historically marginalized groups, resulting in skewed elections.

This report provides an overview of the relationship between hate incidents and elections. The report examines hate incidents in the 2018 midterm elections and other recent elections with the hope that, by better

understanding hate in recent elections, candidates, voters, tech platforms, and other stakeholders can be better prepared for future elections, including the 2020 presidential election.

Section II of this report discusses relevant laws—including both criminal and civil laws at the federal and state levels, and legal frameworks in the hate crimes and voting rights contexts. Section III first takes a look at voter suppression and hate-motivated behavior perpetrated by election officials (e.g., poll workers) and, second, at hate incidents in the election context perpetrated by the general public, other voters or third parties. Section IV examines trends in bias-motivated voter suppression organized through online tools. Finally, the report includes resources, recommendations and best practices for voters, candidates, and the general public wishing to protect the right to engage in the electoral process free from hate and intimidation.

Legal Background: Federal and State Laws to Combat Hate and Election Intimidation

A white man shouts racial slurs at Hispanic voters entering a polling place. A candidate of color receives threatening messages at her campaign headquarters. Robocalls provide wrong information and mock candidates of color. Hateful activity can take many forms during an election, but what legal protections do voters and others have? This Section provides information about both the voting and hate crime legal frameworks that may be relevant to fighting hateful activity occurring within the election context. It also provides a brief discussion of relevant state laws.

The Voting Rights Act

Passage of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution after the U.S. Civil War formally provided for equal rights for African Americans and, initially, these amendments led to an increase in African American voter registration and elected representatives. However, these gains were quickly rolled back when the federal government ended the Reconstruction era and stepped back from enforcing anti-discrimination laws with a series of Supreme Court decisions and legislative actions in the late 1870s. With

the federal government's "hands off" approach, Jim Crow laws and hate-motivated violence meant to intimidate and prevent African Americans from voting, rapidly became the norm in the South. As a result, voter registration numbers for African Americans plummeted due to campaigns of intimidation and violence, as did voter turnout and the number of African American elected officials.

After World War II, the campaign against Jim Crow and voter suppression picked up momentum. Organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee sent young people to the South to help register and educate Black residents, civil rights leaders adeptly used the media to draw public attention to discrimination in the South, and momentous and horrifying events—like the march across the Edmund Pettus bridge in Selma, Alabama, in March of 1965 in which civil rights activists were badly beaten by state troopers—spurred the federal government to act.

The violent attacks in Selma and elsewhere created an urgency that propelled Congress and President Johnson to push for the enactment of legislation protecting the right to vote. Just days after the

Selma attacks, President Johnson addressed the nation in a televised speech, echoing the words used in the civil rights movement by calling on southern jurisdictions to "[o]pen your polling places to all your people," and to "[a]llow men and women to register and vote whatever the color of their skin."³ Five months later, Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 into law (the "VRA").⁴ The VRA has been amended and reauthorized five times—1970, 1975, 1982, 1992, and 2006—with the core provisions of the Act remaining largely the same.

The VRA has had an impressive impact on minority representation. After the VRA was enacted, the number of Black elected officials dramatically increased: African Americans went from holding fewer than 1,000 elected offices nationwide to over 10,000 in 2015.⁵ The number of elected Hispanic officials similarly grew in the decades after the VRA was passed.

While other sections of the VRA address vote dilution (i.e., the drawing of voting districts in a way that inequitably dilutes the power of voters from communities of color), gerrymandering (i.e., the drawing of district lines in a racially discriminatory way), and

other forms of voter suppression, Section 11 addresses voter intimidation and situations in which an official refuses to allow an entitled person to vote. Section 11 is divided into two parts:

- ▶ Section 11(a) prohibits any “person acting under color of law... [to] refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote... or willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such person’s vote.”⁶
- ▶ Section 11(b) prohibits any “person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise” from “intimidate[ing], threaten[ing], or coerce[ing], or attempt[ing] to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote.” In addition, Section 11(b) prohibits any similar attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any person who is “urging or aiding” another individual in the voting process.⁷

Section 11(b) is particularly useful for fighting hate in the election context as, unlike other civil rights statutes which frequently require proof of discriminatory intent or purpose in order to successfully bring a claim, Section 11(b) does not require any such showing.⁸ In other words, under Section 11(b), plaintiffs “need only show that the conduct in question was objectively intimidating without necessarily proving anything about the defendant’s underlying motivation or state of mind.”⁹

Unfortunately, courts have had relatively few opportunities to interpret Section 11(b), meaning there is scant guidance on how this section of the VRA might be used in the hate crimes context. That said, *Daschle v. Thune*, a 2004 case, provides an example where plaintiffs successfully relied on a Section 11(b) claim to obtain a temporary restraining order to prevent intimidation and harassment of Native American voters. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants, a group of supporters of one of the candidates in the Senate race, engaged in several acts of intimidation and harassment. Specifically, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that defendants followed Native American voters at polling places and then stood “two to three feet behind Native American voters, and ostentatiously ma[de] notes, all intended to intimidate and deter Native American voters.”¹⁰ The complaint also alleged that defendants followed Native American voters from the polling place “out to their cars after they . . . voted, walk[ed] up to their vehicles, and wr[ote] down their license plate numbers, all intended to intimidate and deter Native American voters.”¹¹ Finally, the complaint alleged that defendants had a “loud conversation in a polling place, where Native Americans were voting, about Native Americans who were prosecuted for voting illegally in Minnesota.”¹² Plaintiffs successfully persuaded the court to issue a temporary restraining order

against defendants, “prohibiting them from following Native Americans from the polling places and directing that they not copy the license plates of Native Americans driving” to and from polling places.¹³

In 2004, African American students attending Prairie View A&M University (PVAMU) and the University’s Chapter of the NAACP filed a lawsuit against then-Waller County Criminal District Attorney Oliver Kitzman under Section 11(b) and other federal laws.¹⁴ The plaintiffs alleged that Kitzman publicly issued threats of prosecution to PVAMU students who chose to exercise their right to vote in Waller County but did not meet his definition of domicile, despite a prior federal court ruling finding that PVAMU students were not to be treated differently from others in Waller County when determining their domicile for voting purposes.¹⁵ The complaint also alleged that both the Texas Attorney General and the Secretary of State—the state’s chief election officer—issued official election law opinions rejecting Kitzman’s interpretation of Texas election law and permitting college students to register at their college dormitory address. The parties entered into a court-ordered settlement agreement, including a list of prohibited reasons for “actual or threatened prosecution, indictment, or investigation based on non-residency for voting purposes in Waller County” by the Waller County District Attorney.¹⁶

In another case, from the 2008 presidential election, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit under Section 11(b) against a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania who “wore [a] military style uniform[] . . . includ[ing] black beret[], combat boots, bloused dress pants, [and] rank insignia.”¹⁷ The complaint alleged that the defendant “brandished” a nightstick or baton and pointed the weapon at individuals and “menacingly tapped it” while standing about eight to fifteen feet from the entrance of a polling location.¹⁸ In addition, the complaint alleged that the defendant made threats and insulted voters and poll workers.¹⁹ After the defendant failed to appear, the DOJ obtained a default judgment.²⁰

Many of the types of hate incidents aimed at intimidating certain populations of voters seen in more recent elections also raise possible Section 11 claims. For example, during the 2018 midterm elections, the Election Protection coalition received a report of a white man camped out outside a polling place who was actively questioning anyone who appeared to be of Hispanic heritage. The perpetrator reportedly asked Hispanic voters if they were citizens, whether they were registered to vote, and made several loud racist statements.²¹ This is the type of behavior that raises serious concerns under Section 11.

Laws to Fight Hate Crimes and Hate Incidents

In addition to claims under the Voting Rights Act, hate crimes and hate incidents in the election context may also raise potential causes of action under federal criminal statutes that were passed with the intention of fighting hate and racially discriminatory behavior. These laws include:

► **18 U.S.C. § 241**, the Conspiracy Against Rights Act. Historically, this important piece of legislation was known as the Ku Klux Klan Act due to its original purpose of authorizing the President to protect African Americans and their allies with military force against vigilante groups, like the KKK, that actively undermined their constitutional rights.²² The Act was originally passed in 1870 and prohibited conspiracies to interfere with federal rights.²³ The statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution.²⁴

► **18 U.S.C. § 245**, to protect against violent interference with federally protected rights. President Johnson enacted 18 U.S.C. § 245, in the midst of the civil rights movement, to prohibit interfering with or intimidating

any person because of his or her race, color, religion, or national origin.²⁵ Under this statute, it is also unlawful to interfere with any person who is participating in activities or enjoying any benefit provided or administered by the United States.²⁶ This includes anyone’s right to vote, register to vote, or work as a poll watcher.

► **18 U.S.C. § 249**, the Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. In 2009, President Obama signed the Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, named for two victims of hate crimes.²⁷ This law protects a wider class of victims and expands the powers of prosecutors and law enforcement to hold perpetrators accountable. The Act extends federal hate crime prohibitions to crimes committed because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person, where the crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or occurred within federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.²⁸

Depending on the specific facts of a case, it is easy to see how a hate crime committed within the context of the election process may raise claims under any one of these laws, even though these statutes were not specifically



Signing of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act

passed with a voting rights framework in mind. For instance, the Conspiracy Against Rights Act makes it unlawful for two or more persons conspiring to threaten or intimidate any person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution.²⁹ Because the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause guarantees equal rights, the Conspiracy Against Rights statute could conceivably be used in a case in which perpetrators coordinated to intimidate a targeted individual or community in order to discourage them from participating equally in the election process. Furthermore, because "conspiracy" may only require an informal agreement or meeting of the minds, claims under this statute may capture less-traditional forms of harassment and intimidation, such as

coordinated troll storms aimed at voters or candidates of color.

State Laws

As shown in Appendix A, there are a variety of state voter intimidation laws that may be relevant to combatting hate in the elections context. In general, most states have strong voter intimidation laws that clearly define prohibited activities: intimidation, coercion, use of force or threats, and interference with others' attempts or ability to vote.

More robust state laws explicitly prohibit a wide range of intimidation tactics. For example, New York's voter intimidation statute penalizes a person who "[u]ses or threatens to use any force, violence or restraint, or inflicts or threatens to inflict any injury, damage, harm or loss, or in any other manner practices

intimidation" to influence voting behavior and criminalizes "abduction, duress or any forcible or fraudulent device or contrivance whatever impedes, prevents or otherwise interferes" with voting.³⁰ Conversely, Arizona's statute is less specific and simply makes unlawful when an individual "[h]inders the voting of others."³¹

As the summary of state voter intimidation laws in Appendix A shows, none of the state statutes delineate voters of specific protected classes (e.g., by race or gender). All states use language protecting "electors," "individuals," or "persons," or "voters." This means that advocates and others wishing to fight hate in the election context do not need to show the challenged interaction was motivated by bias against the identity of the victim in order to rely on these state statutes.

“Real World” Hate in Elections

Discrimination at the Polls During 2020 Primary Elections Due to Covid-19

The first few months of 2020 have been heavily affected by the coronavirus pandemic. President Trump’s labeling of the virus as the “Chinese Flu” and “Kung Flu”³² fueled attacks against Asians and Asian Americans.³³ From a man being harassed and then getting sprayed with Fabreeze air freshener in a NYC subway,³⁴ to a family being stabbed at Walmart in Midland, Texas,³⁵ these incidents will continue to affect the Asian-American community until this pandemic ceases to exist.

The Asian Pacific Policy & Planning Council has been tracking incidents of coronavirus discrimination and, in the first month and a half of launching a site to track coronavirus related hate, received over 1,100 reports. Trends in the data show that Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) women have been the targets of coronavirus related harassment at twice the rate of AAPI men. Unfortunately, as with other forms of bias-motivated attacks, this reflects the particular vulnerability of individuals whose identities encompass more than one historically marginalized social group. In addition, it is noteworthy that, despite stay-at-home orders, the number of coronavirus related hate incidents remains high, with both online attacks and “real world” attacks occurring at the limited public spaces that remain open, such as grocery stores, pharmacies and big box retail.³⁶ This indicates that, even if many states adopt expanded vote-by-mail procedures for the 2020 elections, hate in the election context will likely continue to be an issue.

Bias-motivated harassment of voters, candidates and other stakeholders in the election process can take many forms. And, unfortunately, harassment of voters has been perpetrated by both third parties and the very officials and poll workers who are supposed to be in charge of implementing a fair and equitable election system. Although there are commonalities between harassment by the general public and harassment by election workers, the unique power election workers hold as gatekeepers to the ballot box makes bias-motivated behavior by these individuals particularly disconcerting. This Section starts by examining harassment and bias-motivated behavior by election workers in recent elections and then turns to harassment by third parties or the general public.

Harassment by Poll Workers and Other Elected Officials

One of the most common forms of bias-motivated behavior perpetrated by poll workers and reported to the Election Protection coalition is unnecessary and burdensome requests for identification from voters of color. As

the examples below illustrate, in recent election cycles the Election Protection coalition has received calls concerning poll workers who requested additional identification or otherwise created more stringent check-in procedures for voters of color.

► **Clarkson, Georgia**—The caller reported that, although they had applied to register to vote with a valid Georgia Driver's License and was listed as an active voter on the state's website, come election day, the voter was refused the right to vote and was told they weren't a citizen. The poll worker told the voter to return with citizenship paper work. After making the trek home, the voter returned with both their passport and citizenship document, and was finally able to vote.³⁷

► **Johnston, North Carolina**—Report that only voters of color were being asked about citizenship and being required to show ID before being allowed to vote.³⁸

► **Mokena, Illinois**—The caller, a naturalized citizen who had voted since he was 18, was asked by the staffer where he was born. When the voter responded he was born in India, he was told that he would have to provide his naturalization certificate.³⁹

► **Brooklyn, New York**—Caller described harassment by a poll worker who made a racist comment about her Asian background as he directed her to a voting booth.⁴⁰

In addition to requesting additional documentation from voters of color, there have also been reports of poll workers harassing voters who are not proficient in English. Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) allows voters in all states to bring someone of their choice into the voting booth if they need help voting.⁴¹ Similarly, Section 203 of the VRA requires certain jurisdictions with a higher percentage of voters who are unable to speak or understand English adequately enough to participate in the electoral process with language assistance.⁴² Often times, this interpreter is a relative of the voter. However, as the incidents below illustrate, some poll workers have been reported intimidating voters seeking the language assistance to which they are entitled.

► **Houston, Texas**—The caller reported that the polling place did not have a Spanish translator as required and, when the caller mentioned this to the staff at the polling place, was told by a poll worker to "shut the f--- up and get the hell out of here."⁴³

► **Dearborn, Michigan**—Report of a poll worker yelling at youth who were attempting

to help senior citizens, who spoke Arabic, translate and understand the ballot.⁴⁴

► **North Miami Beach, Florida**—Report that poll workers were told at a training that they should not speak Spanish with voters and if a voter asked a question in Spanish to not respond.⁴⁵

In addition to reports of poll workers disproportionately asking voters of color for identification or making it difficult for voters who are not proficient in English to obtain the language assistance to which they are entitled, other reports detail even more heightened bias at the ballot box.

► **Glenpool, Oklahoma**—Caller was intimidated by a poll worker who accused her of being "Mexican" and voting multiple times.⁴⁶

► **Lake Worth, Florida**—Report of voters at the polling place yelling "take out the trash," in reference to Black voters.⁴⁷

► **Houston, Texas**—Report that a poll worker questioned the voter's residency and that, when the voter asked for an explanation as to why she was being questioned, the poll worker declared, "maybe if I wore my black face make up today you'd be able to understand me." The voter then walked away but the poll worker followed, and the police were called.⁴⁸

Harassment by Voters and General Public in Recent Elections

In addition to bias-motivated voter suppression tactics by poll workers and election officials, recent elections have also been marred by hateful activities organized by white supremacist groups and individuals. For example, on November 4, 2018, two days before the midterm elections, a California chapter of the Ku Klux Klan called *Conservative Forces* held a “Turn California Red” rally at the state capital. During this rally, white supremacists preached anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim bigotry to its attendees in an effort to promote conservative issues and candidates just ahead of the midterm elections.⁴⁹

Voter suppression and voter intimidation is also seen in efforts to discourage minority participation, including widespread misinformation regarding polling locations and candidates. For instance, in Florida in advance of the 2018 midterm election, many residents received fake robocalls alleging to be African American gubernatorial candidate Andrew Gillum. The recording included a speaker who spoke in a minstrel performer’s accent while background audio of monkeys and drums played.⁵⁰ These calls were ultimately traced to an Idaho-based white supremacy website called “Road to Power.” Additionally, Road to Power released additional robocalls targeting Georgia residents after

Oprah Winfrey campaigned on behalf of African American gubernatorial candidate, Stacey Abrams. These calls referred to Oprah as the “magical Negro” and referred to Abrams as a “Negress” and “a poor man’s Aunt Jemima.”⁵¹ Recipients of these calls also heard a series of racist and anti-Semitic statements.⁵²

In early 2020, after the Lawyers’ Committee brought this matter to the attention of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FCC responded to these racist, sexist and anti-Semitic robocalls and imposed a nearly \$13 million fine on a neo-Nazi responsible for many of these calls. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the FCC has brought an enforcement action against someone using telecommunications unlawfully to terrorize communities of color, and certainly one of the largest civil penalties ever imposed on an individual white supremacist by a federal agency.⁵³

Unfortunately, hateful propaganda has not only targeted candidates and voters on the basis of race, but also on the basis of religion and other protected categories. During the 2020 presidential race primaries, a man unfurled a large Nazi flag from the stands during a campaign rally in Phoenix, Arizona for Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders.⁵⁴ Previously, racist and anti-Semitic ads were distributed displaying Jewish candidates holding wads of cash in Alaska,

In 2020, the Federal Communications Commission responded to racist, sexist and anti-Semitic robocalls and imposed a nearly \$13 million fine on the neo-Nazi behind the calls, after the Lawyers’ Committee brought the matter to the Commission’s attention.

North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and California.⁵⁵ Similarly, in Washington, propaganda was distributed depicting Kim Schrier, a candidate who identifies as Jewish, in a picture with \$20 bills fanned out in her hands.⁵⁶



CASE STUDY: Harassment of Immigrants

While Election Protection received reports of hateful activity targeting a broad spectrum of groups, rhetoric about immigration has made harassment and mistreatment of Latinx voters particularly virulent. For example, in 2018, Election Protection received a report that a white man in Gilbert, Arizona was stationed outside of a polling place, questioning anyone who was of Hispanic heritage and asking them if they were citizens and also making racially motivated statements.⁵⁷ Similarly, in Prince William County, Virginia, a voter reported that individuals at a polling place were yelling at

Latinx voters in Spanish that if they chose to vote Republican, they would be deported.⁵⁸

Other times, immigrant voters who do not speak English are denied the assistance to which they are entitled. For instance, even though California law allows voters to bring an assistant with them to vote if they are unable to mark the ballot by themselves,⁵⁹ Election Protection learned that in Durham, California, a pair of Spanish-speaking voters seeking assistance translating the ballot were told that they could not bring their granddaughter with them to translate.⁶⁰

Online Hate and Elections

In the 2018 midterm cycle and other election cycles, myriad actors—including political candidates themselves—engaged in hateful activities using a range of online tools, from social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, to direct messages, to robocalls. When engaged in by a campaign, these activities most commonly involved fearmongering and implicit racial appeals attacking the opposing candidate. When individuals, third parties, or other organizations engage in election-related hateful activities, it often involves more direct attacks on race, religion, or other protected characteristics or explicit threats to election officials or candidates.

Election-Related Online Hate Occurring on Social Media

Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are the primary vehicles for disseminating online election-related hate. For example, in Wisconsin in October 2018, Facebook users shared a fake Department of Homeland Security (DHS) flyer stating that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would be checking citizenship papers at the polls, in order to intimidate immigrant

and Latinx voters.⁶¹ This incident was reported to Election Protection, who in turn reported it to Facebook and Twitter to prevent further disinformation.

Anti-government and alt-right groups also engaged in online hate targeting minority political candidates. A Georgia Three Percenter militia, “III% Security Force Intel,” used Facebook and Twitter to make veiled threats of violence if Stacey Abrams, a Black female candidate, won the Georgia gubernatorial race.⁶² The Three Percenters are a right-wing anti-government paramilitary group with chapters and affiliates across the nation; they are sometimes, but not always, associated with white supremacists and the alt-right.⁶³ Election Protection reported several of the III% Security Force’s posts to Facebook and Twitter. Facebook only removed a few posts, while Twitter suspended the militia’s entire account.

In addition to using social media to harass, spread misinformation, and attempt to suppress minority voting, these platforms are also used in an attempt to intimidate and spew hatred against election officials and elected representatives. For instance, during the 2018 elections, a neo-Confederate man doxxed⁶⁴

the election supervisors of Broward and Miami-Dade counties in Florida, both of whom were women of color.⁶⁵ He shared the officials’ pictures, names, home addresses, photos of their houses, and other personal information on neo-Confederate Facebook group pages. Doxxing of this nature can be a prelude to violence. Election Protection discovered this doxxing shortly after it occurred and immediately reported it to Facebook, the FBI, and local authorities. The quick response of Election Protection and Facebook halted this particular incident before it could go viral.

Yet another example of perpetrators using social media platforms to spread hate and interfere with democratic processes is that of former Vermont state representative Kiah Morris.⁶⁶ Morris, who previously served as Vermont’s only Black female lawmaker, left office in 2018 after being severely harassed online by white supremacists. The perpetrators used Twitter to harass and mock Morris. For instance, racist Twitter messages directed at Morris included:

- ▶ “Sheeeit, I be representin dem white muhfuggghuz of Bennington, gnome sayin?”
- ▶ “Kiah Morris hard at work destroying White Vermont.”



CASE STUDY: “Zoombombing” Candidates in the Age of Coronavirus

As the COVID-19 pandemic swept the globe in 2020, political candidates increasingly turned to video conferencing platforms, such as Zoom, as a means of holding online events with potential voters. However, online trolling of these and other events quickly followed, becoming so pervasive that they earned their own name: “zoombombing.” Zoombombing occurs when online trolls or hecklers hijack a video call and post or otherwise share offensive material, such as pornography, racial slurs, or other hateful language.⁷⁰ Candidates of color or candidates who are religious minorities have been frequent targets of these attacks. For instance, congressional candidate Mondaire Jones, who ran in New York’s 17th

District, was a victim of zoombombing during a virtual town hall in April 2020. Jones, who is a Black and gay male, was targeted while discussing how to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic to an audience of approximately 80 attendees. The event was disrupted by online trolls who managed to share images and videos of child pornography.⁷¹

Similarly, in Vermont, a virtual forum for candidates for Lieutenant Governor was zoombombed at the end of April, 2020. The event was zoombombed with trolls drawing swastikas, writing, “Hail Satan,” and ordering a Jewish candidate, Brenda Siegel, and the forum host to “shut up b****.”⁷²

- ▶ “Go back to Africa, it’s the only place you’ll ever be safe.”
- ▶ Another tweet threatened Morris, telling her that “Every time you attend a political rally at the Four Corners or another local venue and I’m

aware of the event, I will troll the hell out of you and the other subversives there. Maybe I’ll bring a friend or three with me too.”⁶⁷

The online harassment also seemed to coincide with possible

real-world harassment aimed at Morris, including swastikas appearing near her home,⁶⁸ and someone paintballing Morris’s car.⁶⁹

CASE STUDY: The President of the United States Used Racism and Xenophobia for Political Purposes.

Days before the 2018 midterm election, President Trump shared on Facebook and Twitter a campaign ad discussing a migrant caravan from Central America that was heading toward the U.S. southern border.⁷³ Despite the caravan being composed of mostly Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans, the President compared them to a Mexican gang member who illegally crossed the border and killed law enforcement officers.⁷⁴ The video used racist fearmongering to imply that the caravan was full of “dangerous illegal criminals,” and called the caravan an “invasion,” before encouraging the viewer to vote Republican. The video characterizes all immigrants and Latinx people as criminals and a threat. Painting all people of color, especially immigrants, as dangerous criminals is a common racist trope used for generations by xenophobic nativists. It is also false.⁷⁵ Dehumanization of this sort can lead to violence toward the targeted community.⁷⁶

Facebook refused to take down this racist video, although the company barred President Trump from running this video as a paid advertisement (as did CNN, NBC, and Fox News). President Trump was allowed to share the video as “organic” (i.e. un-promoted) content. Consequently, he was able to share the video on his own page, from which it was easily disseminated even without paid promotion.

The Lawyers’ Committee notified Facebook that this video violated its Community Standards, the rules that govern organic posts on Facebook. The Community Standards expressly prohibit hate speech, which they define as “a direct attack on people based



on” characteristics such as “race, ethnicity, [and] national origin,” including “dehumanizing speech such as reference or comparison to . . . violent . . . criminals.”⁷⁷ Facebook said that the video did not violate its policies but did not provide an explanation for its decision for over three months. When it finally did respond substantively to the Lawyers’ Committee’s report, Facebook said that the video was permissible because it was only implicitly racist, not explicitly racist, and their policies allow such implicit racism.

Twitter likewise did not take down the video when President Trump shared it with his 61 million followers.⁷⁸ The Twitter Rules prohibit “targeting individuals with content intended to incite fear or spread fearful stereotypes about a protected category, including asserting that members of a protected category are more likely to take part in dangerous or illegal activities.”⁷⁹ As with many other instances of the President violating Twitter’s policies regarding hateful conduct, Twitter took no enforcement action.

Candidate and Political Party Online Advertisements with Racist Appeals

Candidates for office have used implicit or explicit appeals to racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia in their online campaign advertisements. In the 2018 cycle, it was common practice for campaign ads to launch first and sometimes solely on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, or other social media platforms, where they could reach a broad audience and have the opportunity to go viral with minimal expenditures. The Campaign Legal Center has compiled an archive of many of these racist and hateful ads.⁸⁰ Some prominent examples include:

- ▶ Tennessee senatorial candidate Marsha Blackburn ran a political ad titled “Caravan” on YouTube that fearmongered and smeared Central American migrants as “gang members,” “known criminals,” and “possibly even terrorists.”⁸¹
- ▶ California Representative Duncan Hunter ran a political ad on YouTube accusing his opponent, Ammar Campa-Najjar, of being a “security risk” and implying that Campa-Najjar was a terrorist.⁸² The ad said that Campa-Najjar, who is half Mexican-American and half Palestinian-American, was “working to infiltrate Congress” and included a video

clip of a man alleging that Campa-Najjar was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood as part of a “well-orchestrated plan.”⁸³

- ▶ Georgia gubernatorial primary candidate Michael Williams published a political ad on Facebook in which he promoted his “deportation bus” that he would use to round up “illegals” and “send them back to where they came from.”⁸⁴ The bus, painted to look like prison transport, prominently displayed the words, “Danger! Murderers, rapists, kidnappers, child molesters, and other criminals on board” and “Follow me to Mexico.”⁸⁵
- ▶ Another candidate in the Georgia gubernatorial Republican primary, Casey Cagle, posted a political ad on YouTube in which he said that liberal politicians in sanctuary cities were allowing “criminal illegal aliens” to “terrorize us on our streets,” while showing images of Latino men with gang tattoos making gang signs.⁸⁶ Brian Kemp, Cagle’s rival in the Georgia gubernatorial race and the eventual governor,⁸⁷ likewise ran a political ad on YouTube showing people killed by “illegal immigrants,” stating he would “track and immediately deport all criminal aliens,” and showing images of Latino men with gang tattoos.⁸⁸

- ▶ New York congressional candidate Chris Collins ran a political ad on YouTube in which he used footage of his opponent, Nate McMurray, who is not Korean-American, speaking Korean alongside images of Kim Jong-Un. The ad stated that McMurray would send American jobs to Asia.⁸⁹
- ▶ America First Action ran a political ad on Facebook attacking a Black congressional candidate in Texas, Colin Allred, in which a Black man’s hand covered a woman’s mouth while displaying text reading, “No gun for self-defense?”⁹⁰

More recently, President Trump’s reelection campaign launched Facebook ads featuring an “upside down red triangle symbol once used by Nazis to identify political opponents.”⁹¹ Facebook removed the ads and explained that they violated the company’s policies against hate. In addition to these political ads, Missouri state House of Representatives candidate Steve West’s campaign website includes an entire page entitled, “Islam is a Problem for America.”⁹² Islam “is in direct conflict with our Constitution and those who subscribe to Islam should not be considered for immigration,” the screed states.⁹³ “[It] should not be considered a religion at all, but rather an alien, seditious and treasonous ideology This cancer on America hasn’t come here by accident and that’s another issue.”⁹⁴



Social media companies' terms of service, and the companies' commitment to enforcing them, range in their effectiveness at combatting online hateful activity in the context of election-related activity. YouTube's community guidelines, for instance, state that "[h]ate speech is not allowed on YouTube" and notes that the company "remove[s] content promoting violence or hatred against

individuals or groups based on . . . [e]thnicity . . . [n]ationality, [r]ace, [i]mmigration status [or] [r]eligion."⁹⁵ However, because many political online ads use dog whistles and coded language, they may not be considered hate speech.

However, regardless of what a policy *says*, the real test is in *how* social media and tech companies implement those policies in

the 2020 elections and beyond. Many of the major social media platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram, have deliberately contorted their content moderation practices in order to avoid enforcing their policies against politicians and incurring their ire. Instances where the platforms enforce their rules against politicians get news coverage because they are the exception, not the rule.

What Should I Do If I'm Harassed? Resources and frequently asked questions for candidates and voters experiencing harassment

What should I do if I see harassment or hateful activity at a polling place on Election Day? (E.g. Verbal phrases like “Go back to your country!” or actual physical violence.)

In cases of voter intimidation or harassment, it is important to alert polling officials to the situation at your polling site (given that the officials are not culpable themselves). In cases of potential violence or direct threats, contact your local law enforcement at 911. For instances of voter intimidation of a less-pressing nature, call your state’s main election office.⁹⁶

You can also report the incident to the suite of Election Protection Hotlines including 1-866-OUR-VOTE. The hotlines provide tailored resources for reporting instances of voter intimidation, as well as next steps to take depending on your specific situation.



I am a registered voter. How should I respond if someone challenges my qualifications as a voter?

Laws vary depending on the state. However, in many states, if your qualifications are challenged, you can give a sworn statement that you satisfy the qualifications to vote in your state and swear to your identity, and then proceed to cast a regular ballot.⁹⁷

If your qualifications are challenged and officials cannot find your name on the list of registered voters, ask for a provisional ballot, which all voters are entitled to. After Election Day, elections officials will investigate whether you’re qualified to vote and count your ballot accordingly.⁹⁸



I am a political candidate or a person affiliated with a campaign. What should I do if:

- I am targeted for my affiliation with a political campaign and am physically harassed?


As with any possible crime, it is important to seek emergency services if you are injured or fear for your safety. If you are comfortable, call 911. Preserve and photograph any physical evidence. In order to get further support, call the James Byrd Jr. Center to Stop Hate's hotline at 1-844-9-NO-HATE for legal and social resources to help you combat hate.

In addition, there are some jurisdictions in the United States that include political affiliation as a protected category in hate crime laws. These include the states of West Virginia, Oregon, and Iowa, as well as the District of Columbia.⁹⁹

- I am doxxed (my personal information is broadcast online) or am otherwise harassed online?

If you are doxxed or harassed online, then it is important to take certain steps in order to ensure your safety and health.¹⁰⁰ You may want to advise other volunteers, staff, or people affiliated with the campaign to also take these steps, as trolls often target more than one person.

1. Temporarily deactivate all social media accounts for approximately a week.
2. If you are receiving death threats, use a service like DeleteMe® or PrivacyDuck®, which wipes your personal information from people-finding sites.
3. Try to remain offline until the online threats subside. Get a trusted friend to read your messages and emails for any potential threats that require a response.
4. Avoid giving interviews or appearing on shows—this would only fuel the hate and amplify the voices of the perpetrators.
5. Practice self-care: be around friends and family, engage in your hobbies, etc.




If you plan to pursue legal action against the perpetrators sometime in the future, it is helpful to follow the following advice:¹⁰¹

- Document online harassment and save the documentation to a secure location.
 - > You might want to enlist the help of a trusted confidant to assist you if the process triggers negative feelings related to your harassment.
 - > It is important to document all relevant evidence—not just the evidence that portrays you in a favorable light. Failure to document all aspects of your harassment might end up hurting your case if it ends up in court. Do not delete messages or other content sent to you.
 - > Take screenshots and note the date, time, location, and nature of the attack if it occurs several times.
- Assess the severity of the online threat—both in terms of your physical and digital security. You may want to contact law enforcement if the threat is recurring, mentions specific and personal details about your life, or can negatively impact your personal or professional life.

► **My affiliated campaign’s website is hacked or shut down by an unknown entity?**

If your affiliated campaign website is hacked or shut down by an unknown entity, including attacks from a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet,¹⁰² then it is important to report the incident to law enforcement. You can file a complaint with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).¹⁰³ Or, you may choose to report the cyber incident to the Department of Homeland Security.¹⁰⁴

In order to preserve your political campaign online, there are several tools available that are designed to help preserve elections-related websites. The Athenian Project helps state and local governments oversee elections and guard against cyberattacks.¹⁰⁵ Project Shield, a DDoS protection service, is freely available to U.S. political organization registered with the appropriate electoral authorities, including candidates, campaigns, section 527 organizations, and political action committees.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, Microsoft’s AccountGuard provides free technology services on security guidance to officials, campaigns, and related political organizations.¹⁰⁷



I am a registered voter who has experienced harassment or intimidation before Election Day related to the election. What should I do if:

► Someone steals or tampers with my political yard signs?

Call 911 and report the incident to local law enforcement. Stealing or tampering with political yard signs from private property may be a criminal violation of local, state, or federal law. The offender may be charged with theft, damage to property, and trespassing.

Although every state and locality has its own variation on political yard sign regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the display of political and other types of signs on residential property is a unique, important, and protected means of communication.¹⁰⁸

You can also report the incident to the Election Protection Hotlines.



► I receive racist robocalls?

If you receive a racist robocall on your phone, call 911 and report the incident to law enforcement. In addition, you may also report the incident to the Federal Communications Commission.¹⁰⁹ If you are a candidate or campaign staff and you observe a pattern of racist robocalls targeting your district, you may want to reach out specifically to the Federal Communication Commission's Enforcement Bureau.

In order to stop unwanted robocalls, the Federal Communications Commission offers several pointers:

- Don't answer calls from unknown numbers and hang up immediately if you answer such a call.
- Talk to your phone company about call blocking tools they may have and check into apps you can download to your mobile device to block unwanted calls.¹¹⁰
 - > Some apps include: Nomorobo Robocall Blocking, Truecaller, Hiya: Caller ID & Spam Blocker, and Call Control: Call Blocker.
 - > If you use robocall-blocking technology already, it is helpful to notify the company which numbers are producing unwanted calls so they can help block those numbers for you and others.

You can also report the incident to the Election Protection Hotlines.



► I receive hateful or intimidating flyers?

If you believe that the content of the flyer(s) serves as a threat to your personal safety or the safety of others, contact 911 and report the incident to law enforcement. Be sure to keep copies of the flyer as evidence and document where and when you received it.

You are also advised to call and report the incident to the Election Protection Hotlines so that we may assist other voters who might feel impacted by the flyer.

Are there any other resources I can refer to if I am harassed in relation to voting, political campaigns, and/or elections?

► For voter suppression at the polls:

- Know Your Rights: Voter Intimidation, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_pdf_file/kyr-voterintimidation-v03.pdf
- How to Report Voter Intimidation, and How to Spot It, New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/politics/reporting-voter-intimidation.html>
- What to do when you see harassment at the polls on Election Day, Mashable, <https://mashable.com/2016/11/07/voter-intimidation-harassment-how-to-help/>
- Voter ID Laws, Vote.org, <https://www.vote.org/voter-id-laws/>

► For online threats, doxxing, and/or hacking:

- Online Harassment and Field Manual, PEN America, <https://onlineharassmentfieldmanual.pen.org/self-care/>
- Crash Override, <http://www.crashoverridenetwork.com/>
- Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, <https://www.cybercivilrights.org/professionals-helping-victims/>

► For harassment and discrimination prior to elections:

- A Guide to Political Yard Signs, Best of Signs, <https://www.bestofsigns.com/blog/a-guide-to-political-yard-signs/>
- Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts, Federal Communications Commission, <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts>



Appendix A: Relevant State Code

STATE	STATUTE(S)	LANGUAGE (IN PERTINENT PART)
Alabama	Ala. Code § 17-17-33; Ala. Code § 17-17-43	“Obstruct, intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote” ; “Disturbs or prevents, or attempts to prevent, any elector from freely casting a ballot”
Alaska	Alaska Stat. § 15.56.030	“Uses, threatens to use, or causes to be used force, coercion, violence, or restraint, or inflicts, threatens to inflict, or causes to be inflicted damage, harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting in an election”
Arizona	Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1017	“Hinders the voting of others.”
Arkansas	A.C.A. § 7-1-103; A.C.A. § 7-1-104	“In any manner interfere with” ; “Make any threat or attempt to intimidate any elector”
California	Cal. Elec. Code § 18502; Cal. Elec. Code § 18540	“Interferes with ... the voters lawfully exercising their rights of voting at an election” ; “Makes use of or threatens to make use of any force, violence, or tactic of coercion or intimidation, to induce or compel any other person to vote or refrain from voting”
Colorado	Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-713	“Impede, prevent, or otherwise interfere with the free exercise of the elective franchise of any elector or to compel, induce, or prevail upon any elector”
Connecticut	Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-364	“Influences or attempts to influence by force or threat, bribery or corrupt, fraudulent or deliberately deceitful means any elector to stay away from any election”
Delaware	15 Del. C. § 5162	“Hinders, controls, coerces or intimidates or attempts to hinder, control, coerce or intimidate any qualified elector of this State from or in the exercise of the elector’s right to vote...”
Florida	Fla. Stat. § 104.0615	“Use or threaten to use force, violence, or intimidation or any tactic of coercion or intimidation”
Georgia	O.C.G.A. § 21-2-567	“Uses or threatens to use force and violence, or acts in any other manner to intimidate any other person”
Hawaii	HRS § 19-3	“Makes use of, or threatens to make use of, any force, violence, or restraint; or inflicts or threatens to inflict any injury, damage, or loss in any manner, or in any way practices intimidation upon or against any person”
Idaho	Idaho Code § 18-2305	“By force, threats, menaces, bribery, or any corrupt means, either directly or indirectly attempts to influence any elector in giving his vote, or to deter him from giving the same, or attempts by any means whatever, to awe, restrain, hinder or disturb”
Illinois	10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/29-4	“Any person who, by force, intimidation, threat, deception or forgery, knowingly prevents any other person from (a) registering to vote, or (b) lawfully voting...”
Indiana	Ind. Code § 3-14-3-21.5	“Intimidates, threatens, or coerces an individual for”
Iowa	Iowa Code § 39A.2	“Intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, a person”

STATE	STATUTE(S)	LANGUAGE (IN PERTINENT PART)
Kansas	K.S.A. § 25-2415	"Intimidating, threatening, coercing or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce"
Kentucky	KRS § 119.155	"Unlawfully prevents or attempts to prevent ... or intimidates or attempts to intimidate ... or unlawfully interferes"
Louisiana	La. R.S. § 18:1461.4	"Intimidate, deceive, or misinform"
Maine	21-A M.R.S. § 674	"Interferes with a voter in marking that voter's ballot ... Attempts to influence a voter in marking that voter's ballot"
Maryland	Md. Election Law Code Ann. § 16-201	"Influence or attempt to influence a voter's voting decision through the use of force, threat, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer of reward"
Massachusetts	M.G.L.A. 56 § 29	"Delays or interferes with, or aids in hindering, delaying or interfering with, a voter"
Michigan	MCLS § 168.932	"By means of bribery, menace, or other corrupt means or device"
Minnesota	Minn. Stat. 211B.07	"A person may not directly or indirectly use or threaten force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, loss, including loss of employment or economic reprisal, undue influence, or temporal or spiritual injury against an individual to compel the individual to vote for or against a candidate or ballot question."
Mississippi	Miss. Code Ann. § 97-13-39	"By illegal force, or threats of force, prevent, or endeavor to prevent"
Missouri	MO ST 115.635	"Impeding or preventing, or attempting to impede or prevent, by abduction, duress or any fraudulent device or contrivance"
Montana	MCA 13-35-218	"Use or threaten to use any force, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence against any person; or (b) inflict or threaten to inflict, individually or with any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss"
Nebraska	R.R.S. Neb. § 32-1503	"By force, threat, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, offer or promise of reward, or other unlawful means, prevents, hinders, or delays any person having a lawful right to register or to be registered from duly exercising such right"
Nevada	Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.710	"Use or threaten to use any force, intimidation, coercion, violence, restraint or undue influence; (b) Inflict or threaten to inflict any physical or mental injury, damage, harm or loss..."
New Hampshire	N.H. Rev. Stat. § 659:40	"Use or threaten force, violence, or any tactic of coercion or intimidation to knowingly induce or compel any other person to vote or refrain from voting"
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. § 19:34-28	"Force, violence or restraint, or inflict or threaten the infliction ... of any injury, damage, harm or loss, or in any manner to practice intimidation upon or against any person"
New Mexico	N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-13.1	"Coercion of voters consists of compelling any voter at any election to vote for or to refrain from voting"

STATE	STATUTE(S)	LANGUAGE (IN PERTINENT PART)
New York	NY Elec § 17-150	“Force, violence or restraint, or inflicts or threatens to inflict any injury, damage, harm or loss, or in any other manner practices intimidation”
North Carolina	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-273	“(3) For any person to interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, any voter when inside the voting enclosure. (4) For any person to interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, any voter when marking his ballots.”
North Dakota	N.D. Cent. Code, § 12.1-14-02	“Injures, intimidates, or interferes with another in order to prevent that individual or any other individual from voting”
Ohio	ORC Ann. 3599.01	“Attempt by intimidation, coercion, or other unlawful means”
Oklahoma	OK §26-16-113	“Influence the vote of another by means of force or intimidation”
Oregon	OR Rev Stat § 260.665	“‘Undue influence’ means force, violence, restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury, damage, harm, loss of employment or other loss or the threat of it, or giving or promising to give money, employment or other thing of value”
Pennsylvania	25 P.S. § 3547	“Uses or threatens to use any force, violence or restraint, or inflicts or threatens to inflict any injury, damage, harm or loss, or in any other manner practices intimidation or coercion”
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-23-5	“Uses any threat or employs any means of intimidation”
South Carolina	S.C. § 7-25-70	“Threatens, mistreats, abuses to control or intimidate”
South Dakota	S.D. § 12-26-12	“By force or violence, or by unlawful arrest, abduction, duress, damage harm or loss, threats of litigation”
Tennessee	Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-115	“Force or threats, make use of any violence, force or restraint, inflict or threaten”
Texas	Tex. Elec. Code § 276.001	“Harms or threatens to harm the voter by an unlawful act ... in retaliation against a voter who has voted for or against a candidate or measure”
Utah	Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3-502	“Force, violence, restraint, inflict or threaten”
Vermont	17 V.S.A. § 2019	“Willfully removes or destroys any supplies or conveniences furnished for voting; willfully hinders”
Virginia	Va. Code Ann § 24.2-607	“Hinder, intimidate, interfere”
Washington	RCW § 29A.84.630	“Menace, force, threat, or any unlawful means to hinder or deter”
West Virginia	W. Va § 24.2-607	“Hinder, intimidate, interfere”
Wisconsin	WI Stat. § 12.09:1-3	“Threaten to make use of force, violence or restraint”
Wyoming	WY ST § 22-26-111	“Inducing, or attempting to induce, fear in an election official or elector by use of threats of force, violence, harm or loss, or any form of economic retaliation”

Endnotes

- 1 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2017 (2018), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/>.
- 2 *Federal Hate Crime Laws*, JAMES BYRD JR. CTR. TO STOP HATE LAWS' COMMITTEE FOR C.R. UNDER L. (2019), <https://8449nohate.org/legal-overviews/federal-overview-of-hate-crime-law/>.
- 3 *President Johnson's Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise*, LBJ PRESIDENTIAL LIBR., <http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-johnson/speeches-films/president-johnsons-special-message-to-the-congress-the-american-promise> (last visited June 17, 2020).
- 4 *The Voting Rights Act*, BRENNAN CTR. JUST., <https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/the-voting-rights-act> (last visited June 17, 2020).
- 5 Khalilah Brown-Dean, *50 Years of the Voting Rights Act: The State of Race in Politics*, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. AND ECON. STUDIES, <https://jointcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/VRA-report-3.5.15-1130-amupdated.pdf> (last visited Aug. 7, 2020).
- 6 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 11(a), 52 U.S.C. § 10307; see Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 11(a), Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 443 (1965) (as originally passed).
- 7 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 11(b), 52 U.S.C. § 10307(a).
- 8 See Ben Cady & Tom Glazer, *Voters Strike Back: Litigating Against Modern Voter Intimidation*, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 190 (2015) (describing Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach's Senate testimony describing the VRA's deliberate expansion of voter intimidation law and lack of subjective purpose or intent requirement).
- 9 *Id.* at 191.
- 10 Complaint ¶ 15, *Daschle v. Thune*, Case No. 4:04-cv-04177-LLP, 2004 WL 3650153 (D.S.D. Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/VR-SD-0046-0001.pdf.
- 11 *Id.*
- 12 *Id.*
- 13 Temp. Restraining Order at 2, *Daschle v. Thune*, Case No. 4:04-cv-04177-LLP (D.S.D. Nov. 2, 2004), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/VR-SD-0046-0003.pdf.
- 14 See Complaint, *Prairie View Chapter of the NAACP v. Kitzman*, Civ. Action No. H-04-459 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2004), <https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/040205-PV-NAACP-v.-Kitzman-complaint.pdf>. At the time of the lawsuit, Section 11(b) was codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b). Plaintiffs alleged that Kitzman also violated 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment.
- 15 *Id.* ¶ 2. The prior decision can be found at *United States v. Texas*, 445 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
- 16 Settlement Agreement & Order ¶ III.3.c, *Prairie View Chapter of the NAACP v. Kitzman*, Civ. Action No. H-04-459 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004).
- 17 Complaint ¶ 8, *United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense*, No. 2:09-cv-00065-SD (Jan. 7, 2009).
- 18 *Id.* ¶ 9.
- 19 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Default Judgment at 2, *United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense*, No. 2:09-cv-00065-SD (May 15, 2009) (describing the allegations in the Complaint).
- 20 See Judgment, *United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense*, No. 2:09-cv-00065-SD (May 18, 2009); Cady & Glazer, *supra* note 13, at 214 ("After President Barack Obama took office, the DOJ's [sic] dropped most of the charges, and the court entered a default judgment against one of the defendants for failing to appear").
- 21 Caller from Gilbert, AZ, (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 22 *The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871*, U.S. SENATE, <https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/EnforcementActs.htm> (last visited June 17, 2020).
- 23 18 U.S.C. § 241; see also *United States v. Price*, 383 U.S. 787, 796-98 (1966) (explaining the history and intentions of § 241 and concluding "that § 241 must be read as it is written — to reach conspiracies 'to injure . . . any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . .'").
- 24 *Price*, 383 U.S. at 797 (finding that § 241 "includes . . . all of the Constitution and laws of the United States" (emphasis in original)).
- 25 18 U.S.C. § 245.
- 26 *Id.*
- 27 18 U.S.C. § 249; see Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4701, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009) ("This division may be cited as the 'Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.'").
- 28 *Hate Crime Laws*, U.S. DEP'T JUST., <https://www.justice.gov/crt/hate-crime-laws> (last updated Mar. 7, 2019).
- 29 *Id.* (citing 18 U.S.C. § 241).
- 30 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-150 (McKinney 2020).
- 31 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1017 (2020).
- 32 *President Trump calls coronavirus "Kung Flu,"* BBC, (Jun. 24, 2020), <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-53173436/president-trump-calls-coronavirus-kung-flu>
- 33 Russell Jeung, Manjusha P. Kulkarni & Cynthia Choi, *Op-Ed: Trump's Racist Comments Are Fueling Hate Crimes Against Asian Americans. Time for State Leaders to Step in.*, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020, 3:00 AM), <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-04-01/coronavirus-anti-asian-discrimination-threats>.
- 34 *Coronavirus Fear? Suspected Hate Crime Targeting Asian Man Caught on Camera*, EYEWITNESS NEWS: ABC7NY (Mar. 6, 2020), <https://abc7ny.com/coronavirus-fear-video-shows-suspected-hate-crime/5989856/>.
- 35 Julia Reinstein, *A Man Who Allegedly Tried to Kill an Asian American Family Because of the Coronavirus Could Face Hate Crime Charges*, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 1, 2020, 4:27 PM), <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/man-attempted-murder-asian-american-family>.
- 36 Press Release, Asian Pac. Policy & Planning Council & Chinese for Affirmative Action, STOP AAIP HATE Receives over 1,100 Incident Reports of Verbal Harassment, Shunning and Physical Assault in Two Weeks (Apr. 3, 2020), http://www.asianpacificpolicyandplanningcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Press_Release_4_3_20.pdf.
- 37 Caller from Clarkson, Ga., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 38 Caller from Johnston, N.C., (Fri. Nov 2, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 39 Caller from Mokena, Ill., (Tue. Sep 25, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 40 Caller from Brooklyn, N.Y., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 41 52 U.S.C. § 10508.
- 42 52 U.S.C. § 10503.
- 43 Caller from Houston, Tex., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 44 Caller from Dearborn, Mich., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 45 Caller from N. Miami Beach, Fla., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 46 Caller from Glenpool, Okla., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 47 Caller from Lake Worth, Fla., (Tue. Oct 30, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).

- 48 Caller from Houston, Tex., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 49 Jessica Mensch, *Conservatives Rally at Capitol, Draw Counter-Protesters*, FOX 40 (Nov. 4, 2018, 12:36 PM), <https://fox40.com/2018/11/04/live-blog-conservatives-rally-at-capitol-draw-counter-protesters/>.
- 50 Jacey Fortin & Patricia Mazzei, *Racist Robocalls Target Andrew Gillum, Democratic Nominee for Florida Governor*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/01/us/racist-robocall-andrew-gillum.html>.
- 51 Cleve R. Wootson Jr., *Racist 'Magical Negro' Robo-call from 'Oprah' Targets Stacey Abrams in Georgia Governor's Race*, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018, 9:07 PM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/04/racist-magical-negro-robo-call-oprah-targets-stacey-abrams-georgia-governors-race/>.
- 52 See *id.* (describing the call as “spewing nearly 60 seconds of racism coupled with a dash of anti-Semitism”).
- 53 Press Release, Fed. Comm’n Comm’n, FCC Proposes Nearly \$13 Million Fine for Illegal Spoofed Robocalls (Jan. 30, 2020), <https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-nearly-13-million-fine-illegal-spoofed-robocalls>.
- 54 Allyson Chiu, *'This Is Absolutely Abhorrent': Nazi Flag at Sanders Rally Sparks Outcry, Concerns About Safety*, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2020, 7:18 PM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/06/bernie-sanders-nazi/>.
- 55 Eli Rosenberg, *Republicans Attack Jewish Candidate Across the U.S., with an Age-old Caricature: Fistfuls of Cash*, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2018, 5:55 AM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/06/republicans-attack-jewish-candidates-across-us-with-an-age-old-caricature-fistfuls-of-cash/>.
- 56 Eli Rosenberg, *Republicans Attack Jewish Candidates, Including Kim Schrier, with an Age-old Caricature: Fistfuls of Cash*, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018, 8:20 AM), <https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/republicans-attack-jewish-candidates-including-kim-schrier-with-an-age-old-caricature-fistfuls-of-cash/>.
- 57 Caller from Gilbert, Ariz., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 58 Caller from Prince William Cty., Va., (Tue. Nov 5, 2019) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 59 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14282 (West 2020).
- 60 Caller from Durham, Cal., (Tue. Nov 6, 2018) (report of call to Election Protection hotline) (on file with author).
- 61 Blake Paterson, *ICE, Dispelling Rumors, Says It Won't Patrol Polling Places*, PROPUBLICA: ELECTIONLAND (Nov. 2, 2018, 4:13 PM), <https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-dispelling-rumors-says-it-wont-patrol-polling-places>.
- 62 Jessica Moulite, *An Armed Extremist Group in Georgia Is Threatening Violence If Stacey Abrams Wins*, ROOT (Nov. 5, 2018, 6:55 PM), <https://www.theroot.com/an-armed-extremist-group-in-georgia-is-threatening-viol-1830240135>.
- 63 See, e.g., Vice Staff, *This Three Percenter Militia Is Hell-Bent on Keeping Its Guns*, VICE (Oct. 18, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ne78pk/this-three-percenter-militia-is-hell-bent-on-keeping-its-guns (profiling Georgia’s III% Security Force); *Oath Keepers and Three %ers Part of Growing Anti-Government Movement*, ADL, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/oath-keepers-and-three-ers-part-of-growing-anti-government-movement> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 64 Doxxing, also spelled ‘doxing,’ is “the distribution of someone’s personal information across the internet against their will” Lily Hay Newman, *What to Do If You’re Being Doxed*, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), <https://www.wired.com/story/what-to-do-if-you-are-being-doxed/>.
- 65 Jerry Iannelli, *Far-Right Groups Just Doxxed Elections Supervisors Brenda Snipes and Susan Bucher*, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018, 5:03 PM), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/broward-countys-brenda-snipes-was-doxed-online-10911462>.
- 66 Barrett Holmes Pitner, *A White Supremacist Hounded a Black Lawmaker Out of Office*, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 26, 2019, 8:52 PM), <https://www.thedailybeast.com/a-white-supremacist-hounded-a-black-lawmaker-out-of-office>.
- 67 *Id.*
- 68 *Id.*
- 69 Michael Harriot, *Racist Shows Up to Harass Black Woman at Press Conference Announcing He Won't Be Charged For Harassing Black Woman*, THE ROOT (Jan. 15, 2019, 2:38 PM), <https://www.theroot.com/racist-shows-up-to-harass-black-woman-at-press-conference-1831776056>.
- 70 Taylor Lorenz, *'Zoombombing': When Video Conferences Go Wrong*, NY TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/style/zoombombing-zoom-trolling.html>.
- 71 Andrew Solender, *Hudson Valley Political Events 'Zoombombed' With Racist Comments, Child Pornography*, THE RIVER (Apr. 21, 2020, 1:30 PM), <https://therivernewsroom.com/hudson-valley-political-events-zoombombed-with-racist-comments-child-pornography/>.
- 72 Aidan Quigley, *Democratic candidates forum 'Zoom bombed' with swastikas*, VT DIGGER, (Apr. 30, 2020), <https://vtdigger.org/2020/04/30/democratic-candidates-forum-zoom-bombed-with-swastikas/>.
- 73 See Donald J. Trump, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Nov. 5–6, 2018), <https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=329386164514007> (displaying archived versions of the caravan-related campaign ads, as well as data about ad spend and viewership).
- 74 See Miriam Valverde, *Fact-Checking Misinformation About the Migrant Caravan*, POLITIFACT (Oct. 25, 2018), <https://www.politifact.com/article/2018/oct/25/fact-checking-misinformation-about-migrant-caravan/>; *Cop Killer Who Laughed at Trial Smiles as Jury Recommends Death*, CBS NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018, 11:22 AM), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cop-killer-who-laughed-at-trial-smiles-as-jury-recommends-death/>.
- 75 See WALTER EWING ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_united_states.pdf (noting that studies have repeatedly confirmed that immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, commit less crime than native-born Americans); Scott Horsley, *FACT CHECK: President Trump's False Claims on Migrant Caravan, Tax Cuts*, NPR (Oct. 23, 2018, 4:47 PM), <https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659917659/fact-check-president-trumps-false-claims-on-migrant-caravan-tax-cuts>.
- 76 See *The Psychology of Hate Crimes*, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, <https://www.apa.org/advocacy/interpersonal-violence/hate-crimes> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 77 *12. Hate Speech*, FACEBOOK: COMMUNITY STANDARDS, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 78 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 31, 2018), <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1057728445386539008>.
- 79 *Hateful Conduct Policy*, TWITTER, <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 80 *Race in Our Politics: A Catalog of Campaign Materials*, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., <https://campaignlegal.org/race-our-politics-catalog-campaign-materials> (last visited June 18, 2019).
- 81 Marsha Blackburn for U.S. Senate, *Caravan | Marsha Blackburn for US Senate*, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2018), <https://youtu.be/9pm4XcREY0E>.
- 82 Duncan Hunter, *Ammar Campa-Najjar is a Security Risk | Duncan Hunter for Congress*, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ou3mUSQuvrY&feature=youtu.be>.
- 83 *Id.*; see also Javier Panzar, *Who's Running Against Duncan Hunter? Ammar Campa-Najjar, a Millennial Palestinian Mexican American*, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018), <https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-me-campa-najjar-20180823-story.html>.

- 84 Michael Williams, “DEPORTATION BUS” TOUR VISITING SANCTUARY CITIES, FACEBOOK (May 15, 2018), <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1697724110322663>.
- 85 See *id.*
- 86 Casey Cagle, *Sanctuary Cities*, YOUTUBE (May 3, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbwE4JrrRpQ>.
- 87 See GOVERNOR BRIAN P. KEMP, OFFICE GOVERNOR, <https://gov.georgia.gov/> (last visited June 19, 2020).
- 88 Brian Kemp, *Track and Deport*, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gx7TsHCH35w>.
- 89 Chris Collins, *Take Him at His Word*, YOUTUBE (Sept. 21, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LMzZ6Vx7L74&feature=youtu.be>.
- 90 America First Action, *Allred Is All WRONG for Texas!*, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Oct. 11, 2018), <https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=2198156230443580>.
- 91 Bobby Allyn, *Facebook Removes Trump Ads With Symbol Used By Nazis. Campaign Calls It An ‘Emoji’*, NPR (Jun. 28, 2020) <https://www.npr.org/2020/06/18/880377872/facebook-removes-trump-political-ads-with-nazi-symbol-campaign-calls-it-an-emoji>.
- 92 Steve West, *Islam Is a Problem for America*, OLD AM. STEVE WEST STATE REP (July 16, 2018), https://www.stevewest4missouri.com/islam_is_a_problem_for_america.
- 93 *Id.*
- 94 *Id.*
- 95 *Hate Speech Policy*, YOUTUBE HELP (2019), <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en>.
- 96 To find your state’s main election office, see *State Election Offices*, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, <https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/stateelection.shtml> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 97 A list of states that allow you to make a sworn statement can be found at *Voter ID Laws*, VOTE.ORG <https://www.vote.org/voter-id-laws/> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 98 *Provisional Ballots*, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2018), <http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx>.
- 99 State Hate Crime Laws, STOP HATE PROJECT, <https://8449nohate.org/legal-overviews/state-hate-crime-overviews/>.
- 100 The tips provided are inspired by the advice of journalist Talia Lavin. See Talia Lavin (@chick_in_kiev), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2019), https://twitter.com/chick_in_kiev/status/1116499716911652864 (“ok, I wrote up a guide to what to do if you’re targeted by the right-wing smear machine. (remember that your relative importance doesn’t matter AT ALL; they love crushing the defenseless even more.”).
- 101 The tips provided are explained in further detail at Pen America’s website. See *Online Harassment Field Manual*, PEN AM. (2020), <https://onlineharassmentfieldmanual.pen.org/respond/>.
- 102 Andrew Lloyd, *DDoS Attacks Can Interfere with Election Campaigns*, CORERO, <https://www.corero.com/blog/899-ddos-attacks-can-interfere-with-election-campaigns.html> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 103 *Filing a Complaint with the IC3*, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., <https://www.ic3.gov/default.aspx> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 104 *Report Cyber Incidents*, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (Sept. 9, 2019), <https://www.dhs.gov/how-do-i/report-cyber-incidents>.
- 105 *Athenian Project*, CLOUDFLARE, <https://www.cloudflare.com/athenian/> (last visited June 18, 2020).
- 106 Dan Keyserling, *Extending Free DDoS Protection for U.S. Political Organizations*, MEDIUM (May 16, 2018), <https://medium.com/jigsaw/extending-free-ddos-protection-for-u-s-political-organizations-94ef1bb896f>.
- 107 Brad Smith, *We Are Taking New Steps Against Broadening Threats to Democracy*, MICROSOFT (Aug. 20, 2018), <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/08/20/we-are-taking-new-steps-against-broadening-threats-to-democracy/>.
- 108 See *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (finding content-based sign ordinances unconstitutional); Glen McMurry, *A Guide to Political Yard Signs*, BEST SIGNS (Apr. 8, 2019), <https://www.bestofsigns.com/blog/a-guide-to-political-yard-signs/>.
- 109 See *Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts*, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, (June 10, 2020), <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts>.
- 110 *Id.*



JAMES BYRD JR. CENTER TO STOP HATE
AT THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW



LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS
U N D E R L A W

The principal mission of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law is to secure equal justice for all through the rule of law, targeting in particular the inequities confronting African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities. The Lawyers' Committee is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, formed in 1963 at the request of President John F. Kennedy to enlist the private bar's leadership and resources in combating racial discrimination and the resulting inequality of opportunity —work that continues to be vital today.

Phone: 202-662-8600 | www.lawyerscommittee.org